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LAW AS JUDGMENT
By ORViLL C. SNYDER
... you tithe mint, and anise, and cummin, and have left
the weightier things of the law, judgment .... (Douay
Version) . .. for ye pay tithe of mint and anise and cum-
min and have omitted the weightier matters of the law,
judgment .... Matt. 23:28.
That "general propositions do not decide concrete cases" has
become a commonplace. Since the days of this utterance, we
have heard a great deal about this sort of thing. The "father
complex" has been discovered and childish longing "to be fooled"
with "myths" of legal certainty has been psycho-analyzed; "legal
fundamentalism" has had its skeletons exposed and the stuffig
has been thoroughly kicked out of "Bealism;" changes have been
rung on rule versus discretion, stability versus change, or perhaps
it is rule and discretion, stability and change; stare decises has
been "viewed with alarm" as a roadblock to progress; and the
"pretense" of legal reasoning has been repeatedly pilloried in the
market place. In short, we are told that the judges do make law.'
Little That Is New or News
There is not much that is new in all this. In our system, it
was understood long ago, and adopted in practice and in theory
too, that judgment is the "proof of the pudding" in law as much
as "the eating" is in cookery. That is what due process and the
case-law technique mean. Few have been ignorant of the "gap
of ambiguity" in the "competing analogies" or unaware that
filling that gap "reflects the power structure in the community."
What else has the insistence on an "independent" judiciary and
on the right "to put one's self on the country" ever meant?
* LL.B., Columbus College of Law; LL.M., Northwestern University. Pro-
fessor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; formerly Dean, Columbus College of Law
(now College of Law, Franklin University). Author of numerous law review ar-
ticles and book, Cmmwr. JuSTICE: TEXT AND CASES (Prentice-Hall, 1953).
'Most of the words quoted are from the "controlling book." See LEvr, AN
INTRODUCTON TO LEGAL. REASONING 1 n. 1 (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949);
FRANK, LAw AND TrE MODERN Mnm (Brentano's, 1930).
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That judgment is of the essence was known a long time be-
fore that too, as the quotation above, from the Teacher of
Teachers, shows.
Small Gains
Still, some gains have been made. The Olympian, "born with
a silver spoon in his mouth," laughed while sticking pins in bal-
loons. He also told us to wash our notions "in cynical acid." Less
humorous, Judge Jerome Frank gets around, "at long last," to
adding a mite with "I think we do not do the best we can."2
Grateful for these contributions, let us take a quick look at




The higher criticism follows an observable semantic routine.
"Myth," "rule-fetichism," "pretense," "convicting the innocent,"
"sense of injustice," "legalistic rituals," "superstition and preju-
dice," "social reality," "dilemma," "bare living minimum," "the
real issues,"3 bombarded our minds. It is all quite overwhelming
and makes one feel sort of guilty somehow.
Some Proposals
The chief pre-occupation of the higher criticism is the "myth"
or "pretense" that the judges find the law. The constant refrain
is that the judges make law, and it is intimated that what they
actually do is to balance the interests. 4 We are reminded that it
is "most important to remember whenever a doubtful case arises,
with certain analogies on the one side and other analogies on the
other, that what really is before us is a conflict between two social
desires .. .which cannot both . . .have their way.... Where
there is doubt, the simple tool of logic does not suffice, and even
if it is disguised and unconscious, the judges are called on to
'COURTS ON TRIAL 87 (Princeton University Press, 1949).
'See passim: FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN Mn; FRANK, COURTS ON
TRIAL; LEvI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING; PEKELis, LAW AND SocIAL
ACTION (Cornell Univ. Press, 1950); CAHN, THE SENSE OF INjUSnCE (N.Y.U.
Press, 1949).
1 FRANK, COURTS ON TmAL .65 n. S.
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exercise the sovereign prerogative of choice."5 The big thought is
for a conscious pursuit of desired social results" and an end to
"dwelling in the penumbra of intellectual laziness ...of follow-
ing habitual patterns of superstition and prejudice 7 and of "dis-
guising the real issues involved."s The judges might well abandon
"the persuasive symbols of judicial astrology"9 and "state their
reasons and .. .adjudge the conflict, thus truly performing the
function entrusted to them," 10 in "direct and outspoken discussion
of the real issues involved."" What is needed, it seems, is a
"jurisprudence of welfare."'2
Some Assumptions (?)
The theme is persuasive, unless one gets to wondering
whether anybody really means it. Take, for instance, an issue
involving a restrictive covenant. Axe we to understand that do-
ing something like the following is actually proposed? All af-
fected groups are to be identified and named and in just what
way their feelings and pocketbooks are concerned delineated;
the groups are to be lined up some on one side and some on the
other; and then, in direct and outspoken discussion of the real
issues involved, it is to be demonstrated in what the social desires
of the prevailing groups are important and worthy to prevail,
in what those of the disappointed groups are unimportant and
unworthy, and in what manner the preference promotes what
welfare of whom. It is a titulating thought.
But maybe it is assumed that, on a welfare issue, there need
be no decision against anybody; everything is in the interest of
everybody; and, consequently, there is no conflict in the interests,
that is, of course, in the interests of everybody who is not dis-
reputable. Indeed, for a horrid moment, it seemed that we were
expected to believe that a "jurisprudence of welfare" would
abolish conflicts of interests. This suspicion-after our having
'Id. at 207, quoting Holmes.
'FRANx, LAW AND THE MoDENa Mnsm 217; Pnmns, LAw AN SocAL Ac-
TION 88.
'PgEImS, LAW AN SocriAL ACTION 80.
8 Id. at 38.
OId. at 30.
:'Id. at 38.
, Id. at 32.
"Id. at 40.
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had it pointed out to us so often that, in exercising the sovereign
prerogative of choice, the judges do choose between conflicting
interests whether they, or we, know it or not, and that all analyses,
arguments, and expositions are, consciously or unconsciously,
motivated by interest-occasioned some astonishment; but hap-
pily the misgiving has turned out to have been pre-mature.
Some Solid Ground
For it is recognized that there are sides and that the judges
cannot decide for both sides; they can decide against both; they
can decide for one or the other; they can disagree as to which
to decide for and which against; but they cannot decide for both;
they must decide against somebody, somebody must go down;
even if they do not decide at all, they decide against the com-
plainant, judgment delayed, etc.; and, if they could decide for
both, either they are the universal Santa Claus or there would
be no issue. There is, however, no universal Santa Claus and
there are still going to be issues. No "issueless jurisprudence" '
is contemplated or expected.
Making Choices Here to Stay
Since issues are here to stay, the judges must choose. The
eventuality is unavoidable in any jurisprudence of law-as-a-
means-to-an-end; and equally so in a jurisprudence of rules. For
the unvarying rules have varying application; the minor pre-
mises, the factual situations, change, even if the major pre-
mises, the law, remain unchanged. 14 Our very doctrine of prece-
dents, consisting as it does not only of stare decisis but also of the
"declaratory theory," is itself what puts expansibility and flexibil-
ity as well as stability and responsibility in the common law,15
though some whose apparent delight is in the shortcomings of
traditional ways seem unfamiliar with this simple fact.
n Ibid.
" This truth runs everywhere through JusTicE CA~Rozo's, THE NATUIE OF THE
JuDIcHAL PRocEss; it is drily dissected in the present writer's article, The Corporate
Person and the Fourteenth Amendment, 8 BRooxL.N L. REv. 4, 17-21 (1938).
"See the present writer's article, Retrospective Operation of Overruling De-
cisions, 35 ILL. L. REv. 121, 128, 129 (1940).
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Giving Reasons
In choosing, the judges, perhaps, have to give reasons. It has
been said that "even a very vise . . . decision uttered without
assignment of reasons may appear presumptious and intellec-
tually suspect."'6 Why it is considered so may be one of the
wonders of the ages, since judgment consists no more in a multi-
tude of words than righteousness in long prayers. There is a
homely adage that actions speak louder than words, which, in
the form of Faire sans dire, The Honorable John Denzil Fox-
Strangways has so recently recalled to our minds in so impulsive
a fashion." Yet anyway, we need not puzzle ourselves; it is the
practice to write opinions and the practice is not dying out. Con-
sequently, the question, vis-a-vis the higher criticism, seems to be,
What kind of plain talk are the judges to give the losers?
Here is the rub. Any old reason given in any old way im-
presses the winners. The losers, however, are more apt to be
afflicted with that "stubborn obtuseness" without taking account
of which "no analysis of human affairs can be quite complete."'8
And "it always gives an appearance of stronger authority to a
conclusion to deduce it dialectically from conceded premises than
to confess that it involves the appraisal of conflicting interests
which are necessarily incommensurable." 9 The judges can hardly
just tell the losers where to get off. Doing that might make sub-
versives out of them. But again, we are not left without succor.
In the "candor of Cardozo"20 and the judicial expressions of "the
completely adult jurist,"2' we are assured we can observe what
good judicial practice is. For Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo
was a judge of "adult emotional stature."22 "His writings have
been of inestimable value in making possible realistic thinking
about law. There is perhaps but one judge who is his superior
in this respect-Mr. Justice Holmes," 3 who was "the completely
adult jurist."
" CA N, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 100.
" See Timm, Feb. 5, 1951, p. 28.
CAEN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 88.
PEPEsis, LAw AND SoCIAL ACTION 33, quoting Judge Learned Hand.
'FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MInD, Part Two, Chapter VI.
" Id. at Part Three, Chapter II.
Id at 237.
21 Id. at 239.
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The Candor of Cardozo and the Completely Adult Jurist
In the famous case of Allegheny College v. The National Chau-
tauqua County Bank of Jamestown,24 Justice Cardozo, then Chief
Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, demonstrated beyond
cavil that, when a person makes a subscription to a charity for
the purpose, among others, of establishing a memorial for him-
self, he gets in return a benefit which has as much legal signifi-
cance as consideration as any commodity purchased with money
in the market place, and that, consequently, he should keep his
promise. Justice Cardozo did not put the matter thus coldly;
in a flow of limpid rhetoric, he expressed his conclusion with
almost poetic gentleness by stating that "the longing for post-
humous remembrance is an emotion not so weak as to justify us
in saying that its gratification is a negligible good."25 Alongside
this circumlocution, we can lay Justice Holmes' witheringly short
"Three generations of imbeciles are enough"26 in the case of the
Virginia sterilization statute. Evidently, there are styles in stat-
ing reasons and the appropriateness thereof depends on the man
and his taste and his sense of fitness in the particular case.
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,27 we find Judge Holmes,
for the majority, discussing principles in general language, much
in contrast to the concern of Justice Brandeis, dissenting, for de-
tailed consideration of the factual consequences. The latter's
opinion reads a lot like the exploration of the facts by Justice
Brewer in the case, Muller v. Oregon,28 on the constitutionality
of the Oregon statute limiting hours of employment for women
(the case of the famous Brandeis brief). The Holmes method
here and the Brandeis method seem both to have their uses and
to be equally good judicial practice at times and in appropriate
cases.
In DeCicco v. Schweizer,29 Justice Cardozo, then a Judge of
the New York Court of Appeals, gave another exemplification of
judicial style. This case involved a marriage settlement. A pros-
pective father-in-law had made a promise to pay an annuity to
"246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173, 57 A.L.R. 980 (1927).
57 A.L.R. at 984.
" Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
"260 U.S. 393 (1922).
-208 U.S. 412 (1908).
"221 N.Y. 431, 117 N.E. 807 (1917).
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his daughter for her life. The promise was made, in an elaborate
document, to the prospective son-in-law but payment was to be
made to the bride-to-be. After finding consideration for the
promise not in any promise by the prospective son-in-law not
to break nor in the fact of his not breaking the previously made
contract between himself and the promisor's daughter to inter-
marry but in the young couple's not having exercised their lawful
power to rescind by mutual consent, Judge Cardozo added: "The
conclusion to which we are thus led is reinforced by those con-
siderations of public policy which cluster about contracts that
touch the marriage relation. The law favors marriage settlements,
and seeks to uphold them. It has enforced them at times where
consideration, if present at all, has been dependent upon doubt-
ful inference. It strains, if need be, to the uttermost the inter-
pretation of equivocal words and conduct in the effort to hold
men to the honorable fulfillment of engagements designed to
influence in their deepest relations the lives of others."30 This
final paragraph has always made it a little difficult for law teach-
ers to tell their classes just what legal proposition the case actually
stands for; but we are left in no dubiety concerning whether
Justice Cardozo's words were true. He was relating the facts of
legal life. Since this is so, we take note of another facet, namely,
that judicial candor involves judicial discrimination concerning
what to be candid about.
What Good Judicial Practice Involves
It appears, therefore, that, in good judicial practice, the judges
use their judgment not only in deciding between the parties but
also in deciding what results of social studies or other data are
available and trustworthy, how far these shall be utilized, and
what reasons they shall give and how they shall express those
reasons.
To What It Boils Down
The higher criticism cannot be called much ado about nothing;
it is more like much ado about what. Yet it has had its uses. It
has "aggravated" a lot of people into remembering that "the em-
phasis should be on the process."3 1 Perhaps unsuspectingly, a
o 221 N. Y. at 439.
"LEvI, AN INT1ODUCTION 73.
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spotlight has been turned on the fact that the efficacy of any sys-
tem of jurisprudence, whether of rules or of welfare, depends
upon judgment in making the decisions. The rules and the
theories are the bones and flesh but judgment is the heart's blood.
This is where we came in.
JUDGMENT
Judgment is more than making a choice; that can be done
by flipping a coin; judgment involves good and poor judgment.
Obviously, nobody can define judgment. Nobody can define
blue either; but the sky can be pointed to and there it is. And
judgment can be recognized, some of its elements can be noted,
and examples are available.
Judgment is not "judicial whim or expediency,"3 2 and dis-
claimed is any "instinct by which to know the 'reasonable' from
the 'unreasonable.' ,3 3 Justice Cardozo, in those renowned lec-
tures, said: "If you ask how he is to know when one interest
outweights another, I can only answer that he must get his
knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience and
study and reflection; in brief, from life itself. ' 34 Justice Holmes
once spoke of "an intuition of experience which outruns analyses
and sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions; impres-
sions which may lie beneath consciousness without losing their
worth." 5 The accent is on experience and the question is,
Experience of what?
While judicial esotericism and any notion that the judges
merely afford "expression of the popular genius for unconscious
achievement of justice and welfare,"36 are disdained, we notice,
in the opinions, mention of "taste."37 "notions of justice preva-
lent,"38 "mores." 9 When we wonder, Whose taste? What mores?
Judge Clark comes along and mentions "Anglo-Saxon tradi-
t' PExLIS, LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION 21.
Id. at 11, quoting Justice Jackson.
Tm NATUm OF TH JuDIcIAL PRocEss 113 (Yale Univ. Press, 1928).
Quoted in FRANx, CoURTs ON TRIAL 174.
"PammaS, LAW AND SocIAL ACTION 28, 32.
'New England Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Spence, 104 F. 2d 665, 667
(2nd Cir. 1939), Judge Learned Hand.
ibid.
' Sheer v. Rockne Motors Corporation, 68 F. 2d 942, 944 (2nd Cir. 1934),
Judge Learned Hand.
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tions."40 This brings to mind that beau systeme "first invented in
the woods,"4' Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, the common
law, and the Constitution. "Words without knowledge" of these
"darkeneth counsel." It is experience which imbues with the
principles and processes and values that these embody which
qualifies for the giving of judgment in our legal system, by which
alone our judges sit and sit to give judgment in its spirit.
Our system has three outstanding characteristics: (1) "Law
is simply a method of protecting freedom."42 (2) The function
of judicial proceedings is to learn the truth.43 (8) The prototypal
standard for testing truth is the "verdict of the countryside."44
For discussion of the first and second characteristics, no time
will be taken here;45 but as to the third, that the standard of
judgment is common sense, or "horse sense" in the vernacular,
a little ought, perhaps, to be said. Justice Holmes once stated
his belief that even "constitutions are intended to preserve prac-
tical and substantial rights not to maintain theories."4 In the
opinions, we are advised that decisions are not to be arrived at
"simply by mechanical and quantitative" criteria;47 that the "lit-
eral and precise" is "not attainable" and "not required;"48 that a
"simple and rational solution" is desirable;49 that remedies are
to be "reasonable and adequate . . . though they may not be
technically and precisely the same" in all cases.5"
" U.S. v. Sacher, 182 F. 2d 416, 463 (2nd Cir. 1950).
"MONTESQUIEU, THE SPrr OF THE LAWS 195 (Nugent Translation, New
York, 1900); see discussion by the present writer, It's Not Law, 38 Ky. L. J. 81, 82
(1949).. 2 KocoIEx, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF LAW 251 (Little, Brown,
1930); Kocoun=, JURAL RELATIONS 15 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1927).
"See: 2 PoiLocK AND MArLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 600, 622,
626, 627, 629, 658, 659, 660, 661 (2nd ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1911);
HOLDSwoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw Vol. I, 308, 310; Vol. HI, 621, 622;
Vol. IV, 528 (Little, Brown, 1923).
" 2 PoLLocK AND MArnrLND, HiSTORY 660.
"The reader is referred to POLLOcK ANo MAITLAND, HOLDSWORTH, and
KocoUmEK; and, modestly (?), to the present writer's discussions in: It's Not Law,
supra, note 41; Liability for Negative Conduct, 35 VA. L. REV. 446 (1949);
Promissory Estoppel as Tort, 35 IowA L. REv. 28 (1949).
"Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451 (1904).
"International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), Chief Jus-
tice Stone.
" Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), Justice Butler.
" In re Annesley, Ch. 692, 709 (1926), Russell, J.
' Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920), Justice
Clarke.
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Judgment in the Spirit of Free Men
In such a system as ours then, good judgment involves the
spirit of free men. This spirit is not interested in chiseling up
words and ideas and putting the pieces together in clever little
patterns; its "organic reactions"-' are repugnant to "seeing what
one can get by with." Justice Jackson has told us that "the very
essence of constitutional freedom .. .is to allow more liberty
than the good citizen will take;"52 and judges in exercising good
judgment in making their decisions are good citizens. They do
not go so far as they might possibly "get by with;" not because
they fear any "reaction of outrage, horror, shock, resentment,
and anger""3 but because they do not want to do so. They stop
in no vainglorious feeling that "I do of my own accord what
some are constrained to do by their fear of the law"54 but spon-
taneously because free men have no "taste' for "running things
into the ground." Judges in exercising good judgment are cau-
tious too of their own "affections of the viscera and abnormal
secretions of the adrenals"5 which would make a mere sense of
injustice their index. This sort of thing is the "subject's diffi-
culty"'( and, moreover, resentment as a sovereign virtue is sus-
ceptible of being overdone. "And when they say 'I am just,' it
always soundeth like: 'I am just-revenged.' ".37 Too much of this
on the bench could breed tyranny. The spirit of the free is not
too much pre-occupied with having been "done wrong by" but
always has within it a spark of "that celestial fire, called con-
science" of which George Washington wrote in his schoolboy
notebook.
Responsibility
Judgment is like unto the cook's putting the right pinch of
salt in the soup. The cook is not responsible for the provisions
given him nor for what he has been told to make out of them;
11 Cm-N, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 24.
'Williamson v. U.S., 184 F. 2d 280, 288 (2nd Cir. 1950), sitting as a Cir-
cuit Judge.
CA N, Tim SENSE OF INUsTICE 24.
Id. at 121, quoting Aristotle.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 161.
IThus SP~xE ZAnATmusTRA 107 (The Modem Library).
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but it is his business to season each batch to taste. Similarly,
judges are not responsible for the wisdom of legislation, nor for
the wisdom of constitutions either, but they are responsible for
the judgment with which they judge what is brought before
them. The spirit of the free requires elbow room and as well
that the elbows be moved within that room as a free man would.
And it must never be forgotten that judges are beset with
peculiar and terrible temptations. Often they could make of
where they sit a "coward's castle" and no doubt they, ever and
anon, refresh their recollection with those monitory words from
"King Henry VII," act 8, scene 2: "I conjure thee, fling away
ambition: by that sin fell the angels."
Mercy and Faith
If we read a little further in that passage from Saint Matthew
with which we began, we find mercy and faith added. This
must always be remembered. Moreover, the spirit of the free
which leavens the beau systeme reflects the joinder of mercy and
faith to judgment, which the Highest Authority made. What,
however, is sometimes overlooked is that to mercy and faith
is joined judgment. While "the morality of society is reflected
in its attitude toward failure, the vertical descent"58-and in every
judgment there is a vertical descent, somebody is decided against
-it is not reflected in this attitude alone. Strength is needed as
much as flexibility.
Some Presentday Voices
It does seem these days that at times the limits of toleration
are exceeded. In the notorious case of the communists, Judge
Medina used good judgment, in fact it is safe to say very good
judgment; but-why was it necessary for him to take so much?
The suggestion has been made that he did not want a reversal
for some trial slip. Justice Jackson, in an address at the dedica-
tion of The Stanford University Law School, July 15, 1950, said:
"Every thoughtful observer must be depressed by the tendency
of many of our criminal trials to degenerate into partisan wrang-
ling and competitions in prejudicial, obstructive and contemptu-
ICAHN, TBm SENSE OF INJUSMCE 76.
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ous tactics . .. The trial judge has largely lost the control of
the influences that can be brought to bear upon the jury." He
mentioned "external influences," newspapers and radio commen-
tators in particular, and stated that "it will not do to put all the
blame for this on either defense lawyers or prosecutors or judges,
or even on the legal profession generally;" but he added, "we
must not allow these external influences to be invoked to exoner-
ate our own profession for the threatened disintegration of the
criminal trial process." In a free society, with a "democratic
nature of the judicial process," another voice can be listened to.
A prominent editor says: "In my opinion, the No. 1 reason for
the failure in enforcing the law of crime rests squarely on the
legal profession. . . . It is my understanding that there are
enough conflicting supreme court decisions to give any case
involving a hoodlum lively going."
This brings us to the "milk of the coconut" in this article.
Examples of Judgment
Before looking at some examples, we must pause to ask our-
selves: "How can any lesson be gleaned? Anything now is mere
hindsight. Eveiybody is good at that. If we had been there,
we should have been unable to do as well. How could anybody
have done better? How can anybody know how to do better in
the future?" Such is not the approach. To paraphrase Edmund
Burke,"o the question is not whether something or somebody is
to be praised or blamed but what, in the name of God, can you
make of it? Nor is the question one of the "stubborn obtuseness"
of mankind, judges included. "'Mit der Dummheit kampfen
Gttter selbst vergebens."',0  We can do no better, though as
"Sophocles knew . ..life is as pitiless to ignorance as it is to
wickedness.""' But we are taken off that hook by Judge Jerome
Frank; he says, "I think we do not do the best we can." Thus
rescued, we are enabled to go on.
"Speech on Conciliation.
IC,%uit.7x, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 575 (The Modem Library), anent
the Girondins. Many people today are making noises which sound like the Gir-
ondins.
Four FAiious GREEK PLAys (The Modem Library), Introduction by Pro-
fessor Paul Landis, at p. xv.
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Earlier
Chief Justice Marshall used good judgment in the case of the
mandamus,6" though, if he had not held the thirteenth section
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 unconstitutional and had issued the
writ, he would have been confronted with the predicament of
having Jefferson laugh at him.63 He had the judicial acumen to
preserve nevertheless the judiciary as an equal branch of the
government.
The next time the doctrine of Marbury v. Madison was in-
voked to hold an Act of Congress unconstitutional,64 the results
were not merely unhappy but catastrophic. History has verified
Lincoln's surmise 65 that, in the ill-starred Dred Scott case, the
justices did not do so well as they knew how. The case "fired
the blood"66 and they reached out and dragged in by the ears a
question beyond the competency of the ermine to resolve.
In a later period, they became enamoured of the corporate
person and freedom of contract. 67 This doctrine, bravely re-
affirmed on June 1, 1936,68 was, under the impact of the Roose-
veltian court-packing onslaught, beggared and left an orphan on
March 29, 1937,69 with the discovery that "the Constitution does
not speak of freedom of contract." It is difficult to believe whole-
heartedly that the judges had no inkling, while they were doing
it, that they were metamorphozing a doctrine into a hobby-horse
which they were riding somewhat harder than good judgment
warranted.
Current
In Cassell v. Texas,7" a conviction "of murder by crushing the
skull of a sleeping watchman with a piece of iron pipe to carry
out a burglary" was reversed, because of discrimination against
"Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (U.S. 1803).
3 BEvEmGE, TBss LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 127 (Houghton Mifflin, 1916).
4Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 893 (U.S. 1857).
rLincoln's Speeches, the House-divided speech at Springfield, June 16, 1858.
12 BEVERIDGE, ABRAHA LINCOLN 469 (Houghton Mifflin, 1928); 3 WARREN,
TnE SuPREmE COURT IN UNTED STATES HISTORY 17, 21, 52 (Little, Brown, 1924).
' See the present writer's discussion in: The Corporate Person and the Four-
teenth Amendment, supra, note 14; Freedom of the Press-Personal Liberty or
Property Liberty? 20 B.U.L. REv. 1 (1940).
"Morehead v. N.Y. exi Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587.
9West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379.
070 S. Ct. 629 (1950).
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the defendant's race in selecting the grand jury. There was no
question of the defendant's guilt. He had had a fair trial; a
"fairly chosen trial jury," "a jury admittedly chosen without
racial discrimination," had "heard the prosecutions' and defen-
dant's evidence and . . . held that guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt . . . (was) proved."
71
Justice Jackson, dissenting, said: "In setting aside this con-
viction, the Court is moved by a desire to enforce equality in
that realm where, above all, it must be enforced-in our judicial
system. But this conviction is reversed for errors that have
nothing to do with the defendant's guilt or innocence, or with
a fair trial of that issue. This conflicts with another principle
of our law, viz., that no conviction should be set aside for errors
not affecting substantial rights of the accused. This Court has
never weighed these competing considerations in cases of this
kind. The use of objections to the composition of juries is lately
so much resorted to for purpose of delay, however, and the spec-
tacle of a defendant putting the grand jury on trial before he
can be tried for crime is so discreditable to the administration
of justice, that it is time to examine the basis of the practice ...
This Court never has explained how discrimination in the selec-
tion of a grand jury, illegal though it be, has prejudiced a defend-
ant whom a trial jury, chosen with no discrimination has con-
victed. The reason this question was not considered is that, in
the earlier cases where convictions were set aside, the discrimina-
tion condemned was present in selecting both grand and trial
jury and, while the argument was chiefly based on the latter, the
language of the opinions made no differentiation, nor for their
purpose did they need to. (Citations omitted.) Only within the
last few years have convictions been set aside for discrimination
in composition of the grand jury alone, and in these the question
now under consideration was not discussed. (Citations omitted.)
It is obvious that discriminatory exclusion of Negroes from a trial
jury does, or at least may, prejudice a Negro's right to a fair trial,
and that a conviction so obtained should not stand. . . . The
grand jury is a very different institution. . . . Its power is only
to accuse. . . . Its duty is to indict if the prosecution's evidence,
'These facts are gleaned from Justice Jackson's dissent. The majority and
concurring opinions are silent on these matters.
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unexplained, uncontradicted and unsupplemented, would war-
rant conviction. If so, its indictment merely puts the accused
on trial. . . . Under such circumstances (those of the instant
case), it is frivolous to contend that any grand jury, however
constituted, could have done its duty in any way other than to
indict. . . . I do not see how this Court can escape the conclu-
sion that any discrimination in the selection of the grand jury
in this case, however great the wrong toward qualified Negroes
in the community, was harmless to this defendant. To conclude
otherwise is to assume that Negroes qualified to sit on a grand
jury would refuse even to put to trial a man whom a lawfully
chosen trial jury found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt ...
I doubt if any good purpose will be served in the long run by
identifying the right of the most worthy Negroes to serve on
grand juries with the efforts of the least worthy to defer or escape
punishment for crime."
Justice Jackson further said that "Congress has provided
means other than the release of convicted defendants to enforce
the right of the Negro community to participate in the grand jury
service; and they are, if used, direct and effective remedies to
accomplish this purpose." He mentioned criminal prosecution
of the public officers doing the discriminating (it is true that one
of the opinions concurring with the majority indicates there was
not much to go on here), mandamus, and suit in equity. He
would have affirmed the conviction of the guilty man and sent
a copy of the record to the Attorney General for investigation
and prosecution of the discriminators, if any. His words are like
a little candle shining like a good deed in a naughty world.
This decision, in the reaching out, is reminiscent of the Dred
Scott case and, in the riding hard, of freedom of contract. Since
the Court not only decides the cases it hears but also what cases
it will hear, maybe a case less dubious might have been awaited
for an opportunity to say whatever needed saying.
In United States v. Sachet,72 Judge Medina's orders, at the
end of the communists' trial, adjudging attorneys guilty of con-
tempt and sentencing them to imprisonment were affirmed ex-
cept the specification that the contemnors acted in concert, which
182 F. 2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1950).
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was reversed. The reason for the reversal was that Judge Medina
should have granted a hearing instead of proceeding summarily
as to this specification.
Since, according to "Anglo-Saxon traditions," the purpose of
judicial proceedings is to learn the truth and not to maintain
theories, figuring out how anybody in another hearing could ever
be so well informed about what these contemnors were up to,
as Judge Medina was at the moment he called them to the bar
after having seen and heard them in action for months before
him, is a trifle on the transcendental side.
In United States v. Coplon,73 a conviction for conspiring to
defraud the United States and for attempting to pass defense
information to a Russian was reversed because the arrest had
been made without a warrant, when it appeared that the arrest-
ing officers might have obtained one, and because the trial judge
refused to permit the defense to examine records of wire-taps,
though "the guilt is plain."
This reversal has precipitated a great amount of speculation
about "guilt proven without conviction," and the case is going
up to the Supreme Court of the United States. The puzzling
thing is, Why was it thought necessary to put the expression "for
the guilt is plain" in the opinion?
In People v. Feldman,74 the defendant was convicted, spent
several months in the death-house, and then had the conviction
reversed. He was again convicted, spent several months again
in the death-house, and again had the conviction reversed. On
the third trial, he was acquitted. The second reversal was for
things which happened at the second trial which were the same
as what had happened at the first trial and which had been pre-
sented and argued as reversible error on the first appeal and then
apparently held to be innocuous since they were not mentioned
in the majority opinion on the first reversal.7 5
Decisions like these four raise questions: (1) What relation
have such reversals of trial judges to their losing control of their
courtrooms and to the "threatened disintegration of the criminal
"185 F. 2d 629 (2nd Cir. 1950).
,296 N.Y. 127, 71 N.E. 2 433 (1947); 298 N.Y. 837, 84 N.E. 2d 147, 299
N.Y. 153, 85 N.E. 2d 913 (1949).
"' judge Desmond's dissent, judges Lewis and Fuld concurring, 299 N.Y.
171, 172.
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trial process" which Justice Jackson was talking about at Stan-
ford? (2) That it is better the guilty escape than the innocent
hang is certainly true in that, when there is any reasonable doubt
of guilt, better not convict. Is it also true that the way to pro-
tect the innocent is to protect defendants whose guilt is plain?
Newspaper men and radio commentators disregarded as un-
informed and incapable of informing themselves in the premises,,
what innocents, in the minds of these cognoscenti, are protected
and in what respects and how by such reversals?
More Examples
But, with us at least, all is not "darkness at noon." Going back
to the times of Dred Scott, we find the knightly figure of Chief
Justice Joseph R. Swan, who acted as a judge and was content
to be just that. In the famous "rescuers' case,"7 6 he, in 1859, a
scant two years before the guns began to shoot, under the great-
est pressures and against the pull of his own sympathies, simply
decided the case before him as he had in his judicial oath sworn
to do. Then too, in 1936, we hear the cool judicial tones of Chief
Justice, then Justice, Harlan Fiske Stone's dissent in United States
v. Butler:77 ". . . the only check upon our own power is our own
sense of self-restraint." Nor is it possible to omit mentioning
Justice, then Judge, Cardozo and Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull.
Zealous Don Quixotes have squandered acclaim on other of Jus-
tice Cardozo's opinions of less consummate judicial craftsman-
ship; but, in Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull,78 he was simply the
judge, though the judge par excellence. The beautiful analysis
of a problem full of confounded confusion and the simple, sane
solution of it vie for admiration with the shimmering rhetoric
in which a stodgy question of contract is portrayed and dis-
posed of.
LEGAL EDUCATION
The law schools have been busy presenting the law as a
congeries of dessicated intellectualisms-rules and principles and
precedents and analyses and arguments and the court says, the
Ex Parte Bushnell, 9 Oh. St. 77 (1859).
"297 U.S. 1 (1936).
228 N.Y. 447, 127 N.E. 263 (1920).
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court says, and the court says. Maybe we have omitted the
weightier matters of the law. We all know, who in a case-law
system could be unaware, that it is the application that is the life
of the law. And after all it is the judges not the conceptual
courts who say. But, when we remember judges, we remember
those whom we identify and extoll as crusaders and statesmen
and, latterly sometimes, as adepts of the legal hypothesis. 9 Yet
the books are replete with examples of judges who were, and are,
only judges, just that and nothing more but most surely that.
Perhaps, some material concerning their performances could be
used here and there in the "cases and materials," with profit. With
this thought, a few sentences from Justice Jackson's dedication
address at Stanford will bring us to a close.
"In training lawyers the law schools are also training these
future judges, for we do not think it compatible with democracy
that the judiciary, as in some Continental countries, be a separate
profession specially trained for the task of judging. Either to
preside over a courtroom or helpfully and successfully to conduct
cases at its bar is, perhaps, less a science than an art. Some of
the best trial judges I have known were not distinguished for
learning so much as for wisdom and common sense and a per-
sonality that enabled them unostentatiously to dominate the
courtroom and be master of its proceeding. I do not know that
it would be possible to teach that kind of art . . ."
As to the last sentence, the answer is a resounding no. But
exposing the students to a few examples of good judgment in
judging as judges will not hurt.
Sometimes opinions remind one of the troubles of Lord Kylsant, who was
convicted of signing a false prospectus every word of which was true. See: Rex
v. Kylsant, 1 K.B. 442 (1932); notes, 45 Hv. L. REv. 1078, 75 SOL. J. 594. See
discussion in the present writer's article, The Influence of Equity Principles in
Embezzlement Prosecutions, 30 I.L.. L. REv. 995 (1936).
